

# SOFTWARE FOR CYBER SECURITY AND BUSINESS RULES COMPLIANCE IN THE MARINE DOMAIN

Dimitri Lyras, Director of Lyras Shipping, Founder of Ulysses Systems


## **Discussion Points**

3

Use case scenario for crew sign on Cyber Security Verification Approach using contemporaneous information


> Abstracted layers for run time monitoring of the cyber security legislation and business compliance rules

Executable modeling framework For denoting system requirements



### Use case scenario for crew sign on

Risk of unauthorized onboarding of personnel and the knock on effect on third parties relying on accurate onboarding information




#### Example

The specific example chosen points to a model superimposed over a personnel on-boarding sign-on application in the maritime domain, incorporating new compliance requirements with respect to minimizing access to employee personal data (e.g. medical data) while maintaining compliance for record privacy when a mariner has to be cleared to operate critical equipment, or when the on-boarding process requires other domain specific business and certification requirements


## Ship trade route from Yandu to Fujairah

**Signing-on act** 


HR Officer, K.Louvari, is about to sign-on (onboarding) Captain N. Mangouras as a temporary replacement in the Master's rank on the M/T Amphion, trading in the Red Sea, mainly between Yanbu and Fujairah. We will be discussing the consequences if a hacker were to perform an illegal sign-on (onboarding)







M/T Amphion trade route is in proximity of three piracy zones: Gulf of Aden, Horn of Africa and the Hormuz Straits. Consequently the onboarding process has elements of risk with respect to information provided to anti-piracy task forces and military forces as well as conventional port liaison processes, including immigration.



# Authorized sign-on Vs Hacked sign-on



1. On a set date the System sends

incorrect crew manifests to authorities. This would mean background checks by various regulatory and corporate forces would be run on the wrong Master.

# Cyber Threat assessment includes hacking but not internal infiltration

The company employing Katerina Louvari excludes the eventuality of insider illicit information handling

In this example there is no concern that Katerina Louvari would sign on Captain Manguras ahead of time, or in any other untrue way because the company does not deem there to be sufficient incentive for her to do so. Katerina has in-house information a hacker would not have. Not even a targeted attack expert hacker

A hacker who may have replicated K.L's authorization credentials would not know background information without which crew cannot enter onboard

#### Corroborating information, Changeover risk assessment form

The authorized person Katerina Louvari has to fill a form, a changeover risk assessment, instructing the onboarding participants of the risks of change in command, by hand with the latest instructions and information from various systems which the hacker would not have access to while also not having the knowledge to select the right information. This corroborating information has different access authorization that is not in the HR system and is a change of command risk assessment form

The form also contains instructions to Captain Mangouras related to the ships current situation which the hacker has no way of knowing.

## **Corroborating information**

The system and the recipients of the changeover risk form would notice an unauthorized person filling the changeover risk assessment from discrepancies in the data recorded in various systems and the data entries on the changeover risk management form, such as:

- ⑦ recent procurement events
- ② current ship operation events
- Commercial risks that the system could corroborate between the risk assessment form written by hand by the authorized person (Katerina Louvari), and other

data sources thereby exposing any lack of contemporaneous knowledge by the hacker

- The changeover risk assessment form will contain recent high level commercial and operational entries, which the two masters would notice
- Errors or omissions show that the person filling the form is, or is not, aware of the current running situation on-board of which both ships Masters are aware

# If not, the onboarding is not the work of an authorized person

## Generalizing this example

The effectiveness of contemporaneous information in making the necessary abstractions in order to deduce legitimate from illegitimate acts in our example, is similar to the abstractions banks use to validate the proper use of a credit card. They ask for information the hacker does not have. Sometimes it's personal information, sometimes it's about the last transaction, as in the case of a card related enquiry after a card has been blocked

## Corroborating info in payment transfers

More contemporaneous information will be needed in marine applications managing processes such as crew payments, for example, where the need is to guard against illicit diversions of funds and overcome impersonation of authorized stakeholders

The corroborating information for bank transfers, in this situation, provides evidence that a crewmember has participated in employment activities and therefore is entitled to certain financial transfers, information that needs to be validated alongside member's rank, years of experience and other considerations

An HR System, therefore, needs to be one system that manages onboarding, crew information, financial calculations and transactions, i.e. a system with high availability requirements

# Access to medical records compliance but no access to medical records themselves



It is company policy, following one of the statutory rules of Information Privacy Law, to conceal medical records from all users and have only the system able to make compliance comparisons

During sign-on the new crew member's medical record is checked by the system.

The system could block a crew member like Captain Mangouras from boarding due to identifying a medical non- compliance

### HR Manager CAPT. B. BINIKOS

#### **Overriding medical criteria**

Only HR manager Captain Binicos is authorized to check the compliance criteria of the system to ascertain whether the enlistment and voyages of the ship in this case, could allow for his medical condition.

In this example the company does not consider the rules to be of interest to hackers nor the overriding of medical compliance rules.

## **Complementary security measures**


Security for high availability requirements can be assisted by various means. Conventional virus and disruptive agent detection, separation of systems according to availability criteria, protection of high availability functionality through the use of tokenized code for operating the protected functionality, unconventional programming and unconventional storage and more.

# **Cyber Security Certification**

By applying layers of descending abstraction it is possible to create a system that encompasses executing models of general rules dictated by business or regulators more specific executing layers that implement of these rules at the enterprise level enriching existing and underlying domain application

The example that follows is that of implementing Information Privacy Law in marine enterprises.





# Modelling the statutory and business rules

#### LAYER 1


Rules set by legislators or business rule designers written in text

Thematic cross industry rule templates *for example*,

- Legislative Themes:
  - Confidentiality of medical records

No access to medical records, or copying of medical records; only medical experts look at medical records and only under *medical circumstances* the medical expert to connect the person with his medical records

 Personnel assignment to Jobs with security sensitivity



Jobs with security sensitivity to be performed by authorized people and security measures to be in place to block illicit interference

- Business Theme
  - Procurement item identification must follow functional as well as manufacturer identifications and each to be clearly differentiated


# Executing cross-industry layer

#### LAYER 2

Cross industry abstraction preparing for same industry abstraction

Cross industry thematic abstractions are modelled and enriched with predictive patterns and generalized context able to propagate and if necessary return converted values to underlying applications This is appropriate because:

Groups of industries share thematic abstractions for example: Shipping and Offshore will have similar medical and similar on boarding rule abstractions. They will also both share very wide abstraction of payment security that involves other industries



# **Executing industry layer**


#### LAYER 3

 Off the shelf Industry Abstractions ready for use across same industry domain

These constitute a model combining thematic abstractions modelled and suitable to the industry

#### LAYER 3

 Industry abstractions adapted to client enterprises for monitoring domain applications *for example:* Procurement, Crewing, Critical Maintenance Work





The layered design approach partly presented today shows an executable modeling framework applied over existing domain applications and business rules, a framework for denoting system requirements and applied to personnel enlistment in the marine domain





# **THANK YOU!**

